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In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation:
Death of Special Litigation Committees?
Anna Panchenko*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders' derivative suits are recognized uhider federal and
state law as a method for shareholders to seek redress for injuries suf-
fered by a corporation. The derivative suit enables a shareholder to
institute litigation to enforce a claim that the corporation, acting
through its directors and officers, failed to pursue itself.1 Historically,
courts have been reluctant to disturb the business judgment of a cor-
poration's directors in evaluating the merits of a corporate claim.
2
However, because the action of management itself is often brought
into question in derivative litigation, special procedures govern man-
agement's authority over derivative claims.3 The special litigation
committee ("SLC") is among these special procedures. An SLC is an
independent committee appointed by a majority of the directors of a
corporation that is charged with the task of determining the propriety
of the corporation's pursuit of a derivative action.4 Furthermore, an
SLC is composed of directors whose conduct is not itself brought into
question by the derivative suit.5 In order for an SLC to obtain for its
decisions the broadest protection from judicial scrutiny, its members
should be independent and disinterested in the subject matter of the
challenged claim. 6
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, DePaul University College of Law
1. Marc P. Fairman, Special Liability Issues: Special Litigation Committees, Criminal Liability,
and RICO, 525 PRAc. L. INST. 323, 327 (1986).
2. Id. The business judgment rule is the presumption that in making business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief that the
directors' actions are in the best interest of the company. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984).
3. Fairman, supra note 1, at 327.
4. James L. Rudolph & Gustavo A. del Puerto, The Special Litigation Committees: Origin,
Development, and Adoption Under Massachusetts Law, 83 MAss. L. REv. 47, 47 (1998).
5. Fairman, supra note 1, at 328.
6. See generally EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 9:21 (2004).
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In a recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision, In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litigation,7 the court imposed a new stringent test for
independence in the context of an SLC.8 The court found an SLC was
not independent when its members had extensive social or institu-
tional connections with interested directors. 9 The decision evidences
a heightening of judicial scrutiny on directors of corporations.
This article examines the Delaware Court's application of the new
standard of independence for SLCs. Part II of the Article provides
relevant background information regarding the origin and develop-
ment of the conbept of SLCs and discusses the case law that intro-
duced SLCs into Delaware law. This section also provides a review of
what constitutes the demand requirement. Part III analyzes the Ora-
cle decision. Part IV of the article discusses the impacts that the Ora-
cle decision has had on the definition of independence and on the
future of SLCs.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the standards that are applied to a decision
made by an SLC, it is first necessary to understand the basic elements
of a derivative suit. Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the plaintiff demand the board of directors to pursue the
litigation, unless the demand is shown to be futile.' 0 In such an event,
the shareholder must state in his complaint the reasons for not com-
plying with the demand requirement. 1
If the plaintiff fails to make a demand before filing a suit, he bears a
heavy burden of demonstrating why the demand would have been fu-
tile.12 To justify excusing the demand, the plaintiff has to allege with
particularity the facts that support a reasonable doubt that the chal-
lenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment.13
7. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
8. See id. at 938.
9. Id. at 942.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
The complaint shall ... allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors ... and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.
Id.
11. See Fairman, supra note 1, at 329; see also WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5965 (2004).
12. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
13. See id.
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In Aronson v. Lewis, 14 the court set forth a two-step demand futility
analysis. The Court of Chancery must decide whether a reasonable
doubt is created that 1) the directors are disinterested and indepen-
dent, and 2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.1 5
If the court determines that the pleaded facts create a reasonable
doubt that a majority of the board could have acted independently,
the court will excuse the demand as futile. 16 The basis for claiming
excusal would normally be that 1) a majority of the board has a mate-
rial financial or familial interest; 2) a majority of the board is incapa-
ble of acting independently for some other reason, such as domination
or control; or 3) the underlying transaction is not a product of a valid
exercise of business judgment. 17
The directors' decision not to institute the derivative action, taken
in the proper exercise of the directors' business judgment, generally
will preclude the shareholder from continuing with the derivative
suit. 18 Thus, many jurisdictions logically adopted the view that the
business judgment rule enables corporate boards to terminate deriva-
tive suits. 19
A. Special Litigation Committees
In many instances, a shareholder's derivative suit challenges con-
duct that either involved or was approved by the present directors,
and, consequently, often names the directors as defendants.20 When a
majority of the directors themselves participated in the challenged
conduct, or when the interested directors effectively control the
board, the business judgment rule cannot shield the board's decision
not to pursue the claim. 2' In such a case, the board generally can
delegate its power to terminate derivative litigation to an SLC.
22
In Burks v. Lasker,23 The United States Supreme Court approved
the use of an SLC to terminate a shareholder derivative action. How-
ever, the Court cautioned that corporate boards may not use this pro-
14. Id. at 805.
15. Id. at 814.
16. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 5965.
17.. See id.
18. Rudolph & del Puerto, supra note 4, at 48.
19. Id.
20. Fairman, supra note 1, at 332.
21. See id. at 332-33.
22. FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 6019.50 (2004).
23. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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cedure if application of the state law would frustrate federal policy. 24
Since Burks, use of an SLC has proven to-be a valuable device for
corporate defendants. An SLC provides the corporation with an im-
portant tool to rid itself of meritless or harmful litigation and strike
suits at an early stage in the litigation.2 5 Appointment of an SLC may
also buy time, as courts frequently stay discovery until an SLC com-
pletes its investigation. In addition, creation of an SLC may facilitate
settlement negotiations. 26 An SLC's investigation itself may provide a
powerful incentive for parties to negotiate in good faith. 27
Despite the potential benefits of appointing-an SLC, there are occa-
sions when the use of an SLC may be unwise.2 8 For example, a court
may refuse to allow dismissal of the certain types of claims based on
an SLC's recommendation.2 9 There is also a possibility that the SLC's
investigation may actually bolster the derivative plaintiff's case. For
instance, it may provide the plaintiff with additional discovery or clar-
ify the complexities of the facts and legal theories on the plaintiff's
behalf.30
An SLC can be formed for the purpose of evaluating a demand
when initiated by a shareholder and prior to instituting a derivative
suit.31 Also, SLCs are employed when a presuit demand has already
been excused.32 In that case, a board of directors can form an SLC to
review the claims raised and to determine whether to seek a dismissal
on the basis that the action is not within the best interest of the
corporation. 33
Critical to the success of an SLC are its formation and composi-
tion.34 An SLC's members should be independent and disinterested
24. Burks, 441 U.S. at 479. The issue in Burks was whether a committee of independent direc-
tors of a mutual fund could terminate a claim pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940.
See id. at 473. After determining that the state law permitted the use of a special litigation
committee, the Court examined the federal policy underlying the purpose and role of indepen-
dent directors under 1940 Act. See id. 484-85. The Court warned that federal courts must be on
guard against state law threats to "any identifiable federal policy or interest, and should apply
state corporate law only where it is consistent with federal securities law. See id. at 479-80.
25. Peter Saparoff et al., Special Litigation Committees: Not Universally Effective Tools, A.L.I.
- A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc. 723, 725 (2004), available at SE82 ALI-ABA 723.
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Fairman, supra note 1, at 333.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Patricia R. Hatler et al., Bulletproof Your Special Litigation Committee in Interested Fidu-
ciary Transactions, 19/4 A.C.C.A. DOCKET 36, 40 (2001), available at WL 19 No. 4 ACCADKT
36 (discussing the problems of the initial formation of SLC's).
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in the subject matter of the challenged claim. 35 Independence is most
easily established when the members of an SLC were not members of
the board at the time of the challenged transaction and were not
named as defendants in a derivative suit.36
There are two principal lines of authority establishing the standards
by which a reviewing court should measure decisions of an SLC. One
line of authority generally applies the business judgment rule in re-
viewing the decisions of disinterested directors to dismiss derivative
suits. 37 The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado,38 took another approach. According to this approach, the re-
viewing court has discretion to exercise its own independent business
judgment in determining whether to dismiss an action, even if an SLC
have been independent and disinterested. 39
Prior to the Oracle decision, the Delaware courts generally viewed
independence as an issue of economics. 40 The focus was limited to
whether a director could be harmed financially by taking action
against another director or against a challenged transaction.41 The de-
termination usually turned on whether the director was incapable of
acting independently for reasons such as domination or control.
42
Domination and control were premised on the existence of a control-
ling or dominating shareholder.43 Personal relationships alone were
not ordinarily sufficient to rebut a finding of independence. 44 The
cases that follow further explain the approach that existed before
Oracle.
1. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado45
In Zapata, the plaintiff, William Maldonado, instituted a derivative
action in Delaware on behalf of the corporation and against ten of-
ficers and directors of Zapata Corp. ("Zapata"), alleging various
breaches of fiduciary duty. 46 Maldonado claimed that the requisite
35. See Fairman, supra note 1, at 334.
36. Id. at 334-35.
37. See Rudolph & del Puerto, supra note 4, at 48-49.
38. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
39. See Fairman, supra note 1, at 338.
40. Eric Landau et al., Director Independence: Impartiality or Isolation, 1418 PRAc. L. INST.
111, 114 (2004).
41. Id.
42. David H. Kistenbroker et al., Director Disinterest and Independence: The SLC-Which Way
to Go, 1442 P.L.I. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 653, 660 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Landau, supra note 40, at 114.
45. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
46. Id. at 780.
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demand was futile in light of the fact that all the corporate directors
were parties to the derivative action.4 7 A number of years later, while
the action was still pending, there occurred a change in the composi-
tion of Zapata's board of directors, with the. dismissal of several origi-
nal directors and with the appointment of two new outside directors.48
The board of directors next resolved to create an "Independent In-
vestigating Committee," consisting of the two new directors, who were
not parties to the suit, to determine whether the corporation had to
pursue any of Maldonado's claims.49 At the end of the investigation,
the committee concluded that the action should have been dis-
missed.50 The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the business
judgment rule did not operate to authorize a corporate board to dis-
miss a derivative action.5 1 It was left to the Delaware Supreme Court
to resolve the different interpretations.5 2
The Delaware Supreme Court doubted that the business judgment
rule could justify a corporate board's termination of a derivative ac-
tion. 53 The court observed that the business judgment rule only be-
came relevant in a defensive sense, once someone challenged the
directors' actual decision to terminate a derivative suit.5 4
The court in the case produced specific rules and procedures that a
committee must observe to be entitled to dismiss derivative litigation.
The independent committee had to conduct "an objective and thor-
ough investigation of the derivative suit," at the conclusion of which
the independent committee might cause its corporation to file a pre-
trial motion to dismiss.5 5 The motion was considered as a hybrid sum-
mary judgment motion for dismissal,5 6 and the basis thereof "[was] the
best interests of the corporation, as determined by the committee." 57
The motion itself was reviewed under a two-step test.58 First, the
court had to inquire into the independence and good faith of the com-
47. Id.
48. See id. at 781.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Committee concluded that the action should be dismissed because "[its] contin-
ued maintenance is inimical to the Company's best interest .... Id.
51. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 781.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 782.
54. See id. The Delaware Supreme Court defined the issue in Zapata as whether a-committee
designated by the corporate board of directors can be permitted to* cause the dismissal of litiga-
tion which was properly initiated by a derivative stockholder in his own right. Id. at 785.
55. Id. at 788.
56. Id. at 787.
57. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.
58. See id.
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mittee and. the basis supporting its conclusions.5 9 Limited discoveries
might be ordered to facilitate such inquiries. 60 The committee had the
burden of proving independence and good faith, rather than presum-
ing independence and good faith.61 Second, the court should have de-
termined whether to grant the motion by applying the court's own
business judgment to the issues raised by the corporation's motion.62
Thus, even when the corporation showed an absence of a genuine is-
sue of material fact as to the committee's independence, a reviewing
court still might not dismiss an action when the court's own business
judgment suggested that it was not in the best interest of the
corporation. 63
2. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation64
In Walt Disney, shareholders brought a derivative action against the
directors, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by 1) approving the em-
ployment agreement by which Michael Ovitz ("Ovitz") joined the
company as a president; and 2) granting Ovitz a non-fault termination
and paying him generous severance benefits under the terms of the
agreement. 65 The directors moved to dismiss on the ground that, inter
alia, the shareholders had failed to make a demand on the Board. 66
With respect to the issue of the directors' independence, the share-
holders alleged that the personal interrelationships among the direc-
tors rendered the directors interested in the disputed transaction.
Also, the shareholders alleged that many of the directors were inter-
ested because they had received directors' benefits and stock
options 67
The court, applying the existing Delaware law, found that the de-
mand was not excused just because directors would have to sue their
friends, family, and business associates. 68 It also held that the direc-
tors' longstanding personal and professional ties to Ovitz could not
overcome the presumption of independence that all directors were af-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 789.
63. Rudolph & del Puerto, supra note 4, at 53.
64. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
65. Id. at 351.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 355 n.18.
68. Id.
2005]
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forded.69 Those ties must have been coupled with an allegation of
control.70
3. Lewis v. Fuqua7l
In Lewis, a shareholder of Fuqua Industries, Inc. sued the Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") and fourteen of the company's directors,
alleging the usurpation of corporate opportunity. 72 In response to the
allegation, the Board of Directors formed an SLC consisting of one
person to review the merits of the claims. 73 The single member of the
SLC, although on the Board, had not participated in the alleged
wrongdoing. 74 Also, he had been a president of Duke University and
a Governor of North Carolina. 75 Through his affiliation with Duke
University and his political career, the SLC member had numerous
contacts with the CEO. 76 In his turn, the CEO made several contribu-
tions to the university.77 After conducting an investigation, the SLC
recommended not to pursue the litigation.7
The court found that the SLC member was not independent. In
reaching the conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the member
had numerous political and financial dealings with the CEO, and that
the university had recently received a $10 million pledge from the
CEO.79 The court stressed that all of the facts had to be considered as
a whole.80 Thus, even if the court took into account social or institu-
tional connections, it still must find that an economic component was
present.8 ' Furthermore, the court established a heightened require-
ment applicable to an SLC comprised of a single member. The court
69. See id. at 355 n.20.
70. Walt Disney, 731 A.2d at 355 n.19.
71. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
72. Id. at 964. The complaint alleged that CEO diverted an opportunity to purchase stock in
the Triton Group Limited from Fuqua Industries, Inc. to himself and fourteen other individual
defendants. Id. Fuqua Industries' interest in Triton centered around Triton's substantial tax loss
which could be carried forward and its intention was to acquire one or more profitably operating
companies and then use Triton's tax loss which could be carried forward and its intention was to
acquire one or more profitably operating companies and then use Triton's tax loss carry-forward
to shelter the future earnings of these acquisitions from income taxes. Id.
73. Id. at 965.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 965. At the time of litigation, the CEO was a Trustee of the University.
'77. Id.
78. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 965-66.
79. Id. at 966-77.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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observed that "[i]f a single member [speciaf litigation] committee is to
be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be above reproach. ' 82
4. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner83
In Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., minority shareholders of the
merged company brought an action against the directors, alleging that
they had breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good
faith in approving the merger.84
The court stated that in the context of a merger, a breach of fiduci-
ary duty analysis began with the presumption that a board of directors
acted with loyalty and care.85 Unless the shareholders rebutted the
presumption, the directors were entitled to the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule.86 In order to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that a majority of the directors had a financial inter-
est in the transaction, or were dominated or controlled by a materially
interested director. 87 The court concluded that, inter alia, the share-
holders' allegation of a fifteen-year professional and personal rela-
tionship between the materially interested director and the majority of
the board did not in itself raise a reasonable doubt about the direc-
tor's independence. 88
5. Abrams v. Koethere9
In Abrams, shareholders brought a derivative action, alleging, inter
alia, that "[a]ll the defendants were linked together by a host of famil-
iar, business, and other ties... ," and that they were all involved in a
network of interlocking and overlapping business relationship. 90
The federal district court, interpreting Delaware law, held that the
shareholders could not compromise an SLC's independence just be-
cause the directors would have to sue their families, friends, family,
and business associates. 91 The court concluded that, to cast a doubt
on independence, the shareholders had to allege that the directors
82. Id. at 967. The Delaware court in its subsequent decisions affirmed that this heightened
standard was applicable only to a single-member SLC. See generally Hollinger Int'l v. Black, 844
A.2d 1022, 1034 (Del. Ch. 2004).
83. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000).
84. Id. at 968.
85. Id. at 979.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 979-80.
89. Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237 (D. N.J. 1991).
90. Id. at 240.
91. Id. at 256 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984)).
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were directly and financially interested in the self-dealing
transactions.92
B. Subject Opinion: In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation93
In Oracle, the analysis of an SLC's independence received a sophis-
ticated articulation. The court explicitly acknowledged that social and
institutional connections among committee members and defendants
might be so numerous and significantly interrelated that their thick-
ness called the committee members' independence into question.94
In December 2000, Oracle Corp. ("Oracle") provided the market
with earnings guidance for the third quarter of the company's fiscal
year 2001. 95 Oracle's earnings were due to be reported in. March
2001.96 In January 2001, more than a month before the quarterly
earnings release, four Oracle directors-Ellison, Henley, Lucas, and
Boskin-sold their shares.97 According to the directors, there was no
reason to believe that Oracle would not meet the guidance provided
in December.98 On March 1, 2001, Oracle revealed that the com-
pany's earnings would be roughly twenty percent below the guidance
the company had provided in December 2000. Oracle's stocks plum-
meted in response to the news.99
Plaintiff shareholders brought a Delaware derivative suit against
the trading directors for breach of the duty of loyalty by misappropri-
ating inside information and using it as the basis for their trades. 1°°
According to the plaintiffs, each of the defendants possessed material,
non-public information, demonstrating that Oracle would not meet
the earnings and revenue guidance it had provided in December
2000.101 The plaintiff also alleged that the guidance was materially
misleading and became even more so as early results for the quarter
came in.10 2
92. Id.
93. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
94. DEBORAH A. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.23
(2004).
95. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 921.
96. Id. at 922.
97. Id. At the time, Mr. Ellison was Oracle's chairman, and CEO, and largest individual
shareholder. Id. at 921. Mr. Lucas was a director who chaired Oracle's executive committee and
the finance and audit committee. Id. Mr. Boskin was a director who chaired Oracle's compensa-
tion committee and served on the finance and audit committee. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 922-23.
101. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 921.
102. Id.
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In response, the Oracle board formed an"SLC, consisting of Hector
Garcia-Molina ("Garcia-Molina") and Joseph Grundfest
("Grundfest"), two directors who joined the Oracle board more than
six months after the Oracle's disappointing earnings announcement. 10 3
Both of the members were accomplished scholars in their fields: Gar-
cia-Monica in electrical engineering and computer science, and
Grundfest in business, economics and corporate governance.1 0 4 Both
were tenured professors at Stanford University, and had obtained
graduate degrees from Stanford. 10 5 Furthermore, both were recruited
to the board primarily by defendant Lucas, with help from defendant
Boskin. 0 6
The SLC retained an independent counsel to assist in its investiga-
tion of the lawsuit. 10 7 The law firm representing the SLC performed a
great deal of diligence.108 For instance, it interviewed seventy wit-
nesses among whom were members of Oracle;s management responsi-
ble for financial reporting and witnesses identified by the plaintiffs in
the then-pending federal securities class action. 0 9 The SLC met with
its counsel thirty-five times during the course of investigation for a
total of eighty hours." 0
The SLC compiled a massive 1,110-page report detailing its find-
ings. 1  In its report, the SLC found that even a hypothetical Oracle
executive who possessed all information regarding the company's per-
formance in December 2000 and January 2001 would not have pos-
sessed material, non-public information indicating that the company
would fail to meet the earnings and revenue guidance it had provided
in December. 1' 2 None of the many e-mails from various Oracle top
executives in January 2001 regarding the quarter anticipated that the
company would perform as it actually did.113
Important to the SLC's conclusion was the finding that Oracle's
quarterly earnings were subject to the so-called "hockey stick effect,"
whereby a large portion of each quarter's earnings came in right at the
end of the quarter." 4 The SLC concluded that the two trading de-
103. See id. at 923-24.
104. Id. at 923-24.
105. Id. at 923-24.
106. Id. at 924.
107. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 925.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 926.
113. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 926.
114. Id.
20051
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fendants with the most access to the inside information did not possess
material, non-public information at the time of the trades.115 Based
on its investigation and report, the SLC moved to terminate the deriv-
ative litigation."16
The court first noted that to prevail on its motion to terminate the
derivative action, the SLC bore the burden of proving that 1) its mem-
bers were independent; 2) they acted in good faith; and 3) they had
reasonable bases for their recommendations."17 The court then stated
that, if there was a material factual question causing doubt on any of
the three issues, the SLC's motion must be denied.1 8 The indepen-
dence prong was the only one which the court addressed.
The following evidence of the SLC's independence was provided.
Neither Grundfest nor Garcia-Molina received compensation from
Oracle other than as directors." 9 Neither Grundfest nor Garcia-
Molina was on the Oracle board at the time of the alleged wrongdo-
ing.' 20 Both Grundfest and Garcia-Molina were willing to return their
compensation as SLC members if necessary to preserve their status as
independent.12' Finally, there were no any material ties between Ora-
cle, the trading defendants, and any of the other defendants, on the
one hand, and the SLC's members, on the other.122
However, through the course of discovery, the plaintiffs found that
the members of the SLC, the trading defendants, and Oracle, all had
extensive ties to Stanford University. 123 Boskin was a Stanford pro-
fessor and had taught Grundfest when he was a Ph.D. candidate. 124
Lucas was a contributor to Stanford.125 He obtained both his under-
graduate and graduate degrees at Stanford.126 Lucas also was a head
of a foundation that had given to Stanford more that $11 million since
its founding. 127 Lucas donated $4.1 million of his own personal funds
to Standford. 128 Ellison was the sole director of the Ellison Medical
115. See id.
116. See id. at 928.
117. Id. (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981)).
118. Id. at 929.
119. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 929.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 930-33.
124. Id. at 930-931.
125. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 931-32.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Foundation, which granted Stanford nearly $10 million in funds. 129 In
2000-2001, Ellison was considering donating several million dollars to
Stanford to create the "Ellison Scholars Program. 1 30
The plaintiffs seized upon the fact that those details were absent
from the SLC's report.13' They argued that the absence of those de-
tails rebutted not only the SLC's independence, but also its compe-
tence, which rendered its report fundamentally flawed. 132
The SLC responded by noting that neither of its members' roles at
Stanford involved fundraising, nor did Oracle or any of the trading
defendant had the ability to deprive the SLC members of compensa-
tion or terminate their employment with Stanford. 133 Due to their
tenured status, Stanford itself could not deprive either of the SLC
members of compensation or terminate their employment.1 34 Essen-
tially, the defendants argued that the SLC members were independent
unless they were subservient to the trading defendants-unless they
were under the domination and control of the interested parties. 135
The court denied the SLC's motion, holding that the SLC members
had not met their burden of establishing their independence. 136 The
court held that the ties among the SLC, the trading defendants, and
Stanford were so substantial that they caused reasonable doubt about
the SLC's ability to impartially consider whether the trading defend-
ants should face the suit. 37 The court rejected the SLC's argument
that the test for independence should focus on more traditional no-
tions of domination and control. 138
The court stated that most corporate directors were deeply en-
meshed in social institutions.139 Therefore, it was very important to
look not only at economic consequences, but also at social ones.140
The court also noted that non-economic motivations such as love,
friendship, and collegiality might influence human behavior. 41
129. Id. at 932.
130. Id. at 933.
131. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 936-37.
132. Id. at 937.
133. Id. at 935-36.
134. Id. at 936.
135. Id. at 937.
136. Id. at 942.
137. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 942.
138. Id. at 938.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 938-39
141. Id. at 938 (citing Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: an Economic and Behavioral
Defense of Smith v. VanGorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 677-78
(2002)).
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The court adopted the following standard: "At the bottom, the
question of independence turns on whether a director is, for any sub-
stantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best in-
terests of the corporation in mind. That is, the Supreme Court cases
ultimately focus on impartiality and objectivity. ' 142 The court stated
that this standard was wholly consistent with the teaching of Aronson,
which defined independence as meaning that "a director's decision
[was] based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board
rather than extraneous considerations or influences."'143
The court acknowledged that Delaware case law had been inconsis-
tent in applying the general standards of independence. 144 However,
the court relied on Mizel v. Connelly 45 to support the proposition that
the Delaware courts recognized the importance of family relationship
in analyzing the director's independence. 146
In Mizel, shareholders brought a derivative action, challenging a
transaction between the nominal defendant President Casinos, Inc.
("President Casinos") and a corporation wholly owned by President
Casinos' Chairman, CEO, and the largest shareholder, John Connelly
("Connelly"). 147 Connelly and two of his management subordinates,
one of whom was Connelly's grandson, comprised a majority of the
board of directors of President Casinos.148 The court held that the
shareholders' demand was excused and denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss.149 In doing so, the court relied on the first prong of the
Aronson's test.' 50 The court found that the board of directors was not
independent because Connelly had a considerable influence over the
economic fates of the two subordinates: they both derived their princi-
pal income from their employment at President Casinos. 15' The court
also found the fact that one of the subordinates was Connelly's grand-
son further supported the inability to consider a demand
impartially.152
However, the Oracle court also acknowledged that a majority of the
case law concentrated on whether there were economical material ties
142. Id. at 938 (citing Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1232
(Del. Ch. 2001)).
143. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 938 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984)).
144. Id. at 939.
145. Mizel v. Connelly, 1999 WL 550369 (Del. Ch. 1999).
146. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 939.
147. Mizel, 1999 WL 550369 at *1-3.
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *4.
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between the interested party and the director whose impartiality was
questioned. 153 Also, the court emphasized the fact that the outside
directors' various ties to Stanford only emerged after the plaintiffs
completed limited discovery. 154 The SLC's report noted only that
Boskin was a professor at Stanford and that the SLC members were
aware that Lucas had made certain donations to Stanford, but the do-
nations were presented as rather insubstantial. 155 The court found
that in the view of the modesty of those disclosed ties, "it was with
some shock that a series of other ties among Stanford, Oracle, and the
[t]rading [d]efendants emerged during discovery. ' 156
The court gave little weight to the SLC's argument that it was una-
ware of just how substantial the directors' beneficence to Stanford had
been. 15 7 It did so for two reasons. First, it undermined confidence
that the SLC had examined the trading defendants' ties to Stanford in
preparing its report.158 The report's failure to identify those ties was
important because it was the SLC's burden to show independence. 159
Second, there were too many visible manifestations of directors' status
as major contributors. 160 The court also rejected the SLC's argument
that contributions, while seemingly large, constituted a very small pro-
portion of Stanford's endowment and annual donations, and, there-
fore, could not be materially important. 161
C. Beam v. Stewart Limited the Application of Oracle.
In Beam,1 62 shareholders brought a derivative action, alleging illegal
insider stock sales by Martha Stewart ("Stewart"), a director of
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. ("MSO"). 16 3 Count one of
the plaintiff's complaint alleged that Stewart breached her fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care by illegally selling her personal shares of an
unrelated company, ImClone, in December 2001, and thereafter mis-
handling the media attention that ensued.164
153. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 936 (citing Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963,
980-83 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
154. Id. at 929.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 943.
158. Id.
159. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 943.
160. Id. at 944.
161. Id. at 945.
162. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
163. Id. at 1044.
164. Id.
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The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed count one of the com-
plaint for failure to plead particularized facts demonstrating presuit
demand futility in accordance with the Delaware Chancery Court
Rule 23.1.165 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
plaintiff had not pleaded sufficient facts to support a reasonable infer-
ence that a majority of the MSO directors were not independent. 166
The plaintiff alleged a personal relationship to support the lack of
the director's independence. 167 But the court found that the Dela-
ware law required substantially more than that. 168 The court noted
that there was a presumption that the directors were independent, and
to overcome that presumption, "a plaintiff must plead facts that would
support the inference that because of the nature of a relationship or
additional circumstances . .. the non-interested director would be
more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship
with the interested director. '169
In Beam, the court addressed Oracle's discussion of director inde-
pendence in the SLC context. The court limited the implication of
Oracle.170 The court noted that, unlike demand-excusal context,
where the board was presumed to be independent, the SLC had the
burden of establishing its own independence. 171 The court also ob-
served that the SLC analysis contemplated not only a shift in the bur-
den of persuasion, but also the availability of discovery into various
issues, including independence. 172 The court suggested that, while the
definitions of director's interest and independence in the presuit de-
mand and SLC contexts were nominally identical, the procedural dif-
ferences between the two types of cases might, as a practical matter,
make it impossible for an SLC to establish its independence.173
III. ANALYSIS
This section scrutinizes the Oracle opinion. First, it argues that the
Oracle court applied a standard for independence that the Delaware
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1057.
167. Id. at 1047.
168. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050.
169. Id. at 1052.
170. Id. at 1054-56.
171. Id. at 1055.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1055. "We need not decide whether the substantive standard of independence
in an SLC case differs from that in a presuit demand case. As a practical matter, the procedural
distinction relating to the diametrically-opposed burdens and the availability of discovery into
independence may be outcome-determinative on the issue of independence." Id. at 1055.
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courts had not applied before. Second, it addresses the point that the
extensive social and institutional connections were not the only reason
for the court's decision; the section will also discuss the role that fail-
ure to disclose those connections and burden of proof played in the
outcome of the case. Next, it discusses the Beam case that limited
Oracle in holding that it may be impossible to establish independence
in the SLC context.
A. Standard for Independence.
The Oracle court's analysis of independence was not a simple appli-
cation of the principles established in Zapata. Unlike in Zapata, the
analysis focused almost exclusively on non-financial influences. The
decision opened the door to the consideration of such tenuous ties as
those among a teacher and a student, fellow professors and committee
members. 174 The following arguments further explain that the Oracle
analysis of independence was a novel one.
First, the court's analysis of independence took into account the in-
dividual circumstances of the people in question and was far more
nuanced than a typical analysis of independence. 175 The court noted
that Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of
human nature that simplified human motions on the lines of the least
sophisticated notions of the law and economics movement. 176 The
court pointed to the fact that corporate directors were generally the
sort of people deeply enmeshed in social institutions. 177
However, the court's analysis of human nature hardly explains the
case holding. It is difficult not to agree with the court's statements.
On the other hand, personal relationships always exist. And as the
Oracle court correctly observed, the corporate directors are also
humans. Directors do not come to a board as strangers; they must be
elected. 178 Therefore, simply owning enough stock to elect a director
should not rebut independence. Otherwise, a director will never be
considered independent if, for example, there is a controlling share-
holder group.179 The formation of an SLC is always a difficult task.180
174. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). "But also think
of motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their behav-
ior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values." Id.
175. Mark J. Loewenstein, Beam v. Stewart: Friendship Is not Enough, 18 No. 6 INSIGHTs 22,
23 (2004), available at WL 18 No. 6 INSIT 22.
176. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 938.
177. Id.
178. Landau, supra note 40, at 126.
179. Id. "The question of independence must focus on whether a director has the ability to
dispassionately and independently render a decision, not on whether he hypothetically might be
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Most of the times, it is almost impossible to compose an SLC of totally
unknown persons.' 8 ' However, the Oracle court's focus on human na-
ture makes formation of an SLC more difficult. Now, even a dinner
with the co-workers can divest members of an SLC of independence.
Second, the Oracle approach to independence was expressly re-
jected by the Delaware court in its previous decisions. In Walt Disney,
the court refused to find that the directors were not independent, even
though there was a much more solid basis for such a finding than in
the Oracle case.182 In doing so, the court expressly stated that it was
not enough to be friends, business associates, or members of the fam-
ily to overcome the presumption of independence. 183 In Crescent/
Mach I Partners, L.P., the. court also stated that the allegation of a
fifteen-year professional and personal relationship between a materi-
ally interested director and the majority of the board was not enough
to raise a doubt about the director's independence. 184 Moreover, the
court held that the director's financial self-interest in the transaction
did not preclude his ability to independently evaluate the fairness of
the transaction. 85 Furthermore, in Abrams, a federal district court,
interpreting Delaware law, found that the shareholders could not
compromise the directors' independence just because the directors
would have to sue their families, friends, and business associates. 186
Third, although the Oracle court recognized that its analysis of inde-
pendence was inconsistent with the majority of the existing case law, it
failed to overrule the above-mentioned cases or to reconcile the con-
troversy. It simply stated that it applied the independence inquiry
that the Supreme Court had articulated in a manner that was faithful
to its essential spirit.' 8 7 It also said that the formulation of indepen-
dence 88 that the court adopted was wholly consistent with the teach-
ing of Aronson. Aronson defined independence as meaning that "a
worried about his position or his compensation, an allegation which could easily be asserted in
most instances." Id.
180. See Hatler, supra note 34, at 40.
181. Id. at 41.
182. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del. Ch. 1998). For instance,
the shareholders alleged not only the longstanding personal relationship, but also director's ben-
efits and stock options. Id. at 355 n.18.
183. Id.
184. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Thrner, 846 A.2d 963, 980-81 (Del. Ch. 2000).
185. Id.
186. Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 256 (D. N.J. 1991).
187. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939 (Del. Ch. 2003).
188. Id. at 938. "At the bottom, the question of independence turns on whether a director, for
any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of the corpo-
ration in mind. That is, the Supreme Court cases ultimately focus on impartiality and objectiv-
ity." Id.
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director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject
before the board rather than extraneous consideration or influ-
ences."'189 However, this statement from Aronson is very ambiguous
and is open to many different interpretations. Thus, although it is true
that "consideration or influences" can be of various sorts, including
personal, it is also true that the Delaware court never interpreted
them this way. 190 Therefore, it is hard to see how the teaching from
Aronson supports the court's position in Oracle. With the same suc-
cess, the court could cite this proposition to reach the opposite
conclusion.
Fourth, the court's reliance on Mizel v. Connelly' 91 to support its
position that the Delaware law recognized the bias producing poten-
tial of family relationships is, probably, unwarranted for the following
reasons. The Mizel case involved a close family relationship: grandfa-
ther and grandson. To the contrary, the Oracle case involved only a
social relationship: students and professors. Besides, in Mizel, the
court did not find the director independent solely on that ground. The
court primarily relied on the fact that the members of the board, in-
cluding the grandson, each derived their principal income from their
employment at President Casinos. 192 Therefore, the economic factor
was still present.
On the other hand, the facts of Oracle are more similar to the facts
of Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner. 93 In Crescent/Mach I
Partner, L.P., the plaintiff minority shareholder alleged the longstand-
ing professional and personal (but not family) relationship to support
the director's lack of independence. However, the court found that
those allegations were not enough. They alone failed to support the
allegation that the director could not exercise his independent busi-
ness judgment in approving the transaction.194 Nevertheless, the Ora-
cle court refused to follow this precedent.
Finally, even if it is true that the Oracle court applied the existing
standard of independence, and that the social or institutional connec-
tions were the components that the courts always took into account,
these components were not decisive ones. Indeed, courts that have
considered social or institutional connections have often held that
189. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
190. See generally Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Trner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000); In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998); Abrams v. Koether, 766 F.
Supp. 237 (D. N.J. 1991).
191. Mizel v. Connelly, 1999 WL 5500369 (Del. Ch. 1999).
192. Id. at *3.
193. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Thrner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000).
194. Id. at 980-81.
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there must also be some economic component to warrant a finding
against independence. 195 For instance, in Lewis v. Fuqua,196 the Court
of Chancery held that a university president, who served on an SLC,
was not considered independent where he had numerous political and
financial dealings with the CEO, the CEO was a trustee of the univer-
sity, and the university had recently received a $10 million pledge
from the corporation and CEO. 197 Oracle is distinguishable from this
case in several important aspects. In reaching its conclusion, the Ora-
cle court did not rely on the financial aspects of the transaction at all.
To the contrary, it placed the whole emphasis only on the social as-
pect. 198 Thus, it is difficult to agree with the court's position that the
standard applied is the standard that always existed and was consis-
tent with the previous case law.
Furthermore, in Fuqua, the SLC.consisted of only one member.199
In that case, the court established a heightened requirement applica-
ble to an SLC comprised of a single member.2°° Thus, the Fuqua deci-
sion gave force to the practical notion that a single-member SLC was
more susceptible to external influences than-an SLC balanced by mul-
tiple members.201 The Delaware court in its subsequent decisions af-
firmed that the heightened requirement was applicable only to a
single-member SLC.20 2 However, the court had never applied the
heightened standard to an SLC comprised of multiple members. 20 3
195. Landau, supra note 40, at 115.
196. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
197. Id.
198. Although it is true that the Oracle court pointed to the defendant's substantial contribu-
tions to the university in which the SLC's members were professors, it is also true that the court
did not find that those contributions made the SLC's members financially dependent. See Ora-
cle, 824 A.2d at 938-42.
199. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 965. "The Board of Directors named Terry Sanford as the single
member Committee. Mr. Sanford, although a member of the Board of Directors of Fuqua In-
dustries, had not participated in the purchase of the Triton stock." Id.
200. Id. at 967:
If a single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be
above reproach. Terry Sanford is, unfortunately, the sole member of the Committee.
His past and present associations raise a question of fact as to his independence. This
alone is grounds to deny the motion to dismiss under the first test set forth in Zapata.
Id.
201. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 666.
202. Hollinger Int'l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1034 (Del. Ch. 2004) "Realizing that a single-
member Special Committee was oxymoronic and unwise, the International board decided to add
new directors who could join Paris on the Special Committee." Id.
203. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 666-67:
In Martha Stewart, the Delaware Supreme Court ignored that the Chancery Court in
Fuqua was evaluating the independence of a single-member SLC and adopted this
heightened standard for all SLC's. Thus, according to the Delaware Supreme Court,
"[u]nlike the demand excusal context, where the board is presumed to be independent,
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For this reason, before Oracle, legal consultants typically advised the
board that its SLC must comprise more than one member.
204
Besides, in Oracle, unlike in Fuqua, none of the SLC members were
on the Board of Directors at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.
20 5
Also, it is important to note that the positions the SLC members occu-
pied outside of the corporation in Oracle were different from those of
the SLC member in Fuqua. In Fuqua, the SLC member was a presi-
dent of Duke University.20 6 In Oracle, they were just professors at
Stanford University.20 7
B. Failure to Disclose
The social ties among the SLC's members, Oracle, and the director
defendants were not the only factor contributing to the denial of the
SLC's motion. Important was the fact that the SLC did not fully dis-
close those ties in its motion. The plaintiffs uncovered those ties in
discovery after the SLC filed its Motion to Terminate. The SLC's re-
port noted only that Boskin was a professor at Stanford and the SLC
members were aware that Lucas had made certain donations to Stan-
ford, but the donations were presented as rather insubstantial. 20 8 The
court found the disparity between the SLC's disclosure and the truth
shocking:
In the view of the modesty of these disclosed ties, it was with some
shock that a series of other ties among Stanford, Oracle, and the
Trading Defendants emerged during discovery. Although the plain-
tiffs have embellished these ties considerably beyond what is rea-
sonable, the plain facts are a striking departure from the picture
presented in the Report.20
9
A close reading of Oracle strongly suggests that the court drew an
adverse inference from the SLC's failure to be completely honest with
the court. Moreover, it seems possible that if the members of the SLC
the SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must
be 'like Caesar's wife'-'above reproach."' It is not clear whether the Delaware Su-
preme Court intended to heighten the burden for all SLC's or whether its comment was
the result of imprecise drafting.
Id.
204. Hatler, supra note 34, at 44. "The cases demonstrate that courts are often influenced by
the number of members on a special committee. Thus, you should advise your board to select as
many disinterested directors as possible to serve on a special committee." Id.
205. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 929 (Del. Ch. 2003).
206. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 965 (Del. Ch. 1985).
207. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 930-31.
208. Id. at 931-32.
209. Id. at 929-30.
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had fully disclosed the social ties in their report, the Oracle's holding
would have been different.
While the disparity between the facts disclosed in the SLC's report
and the reality might be considered significant now after the Oracle
decision, it is understandable why the SLC's members failed to dis-
close the social ties that had existed among them and the directors.
Given the state of then existing law that considered a personal rela-
tionship as insufficient to rebut a finding of independence, it was un-
likely that any board or SLC would have viewed as material any of the
connections that the Oracle court found compelling.
The court also was not satisfied with the explanation the SLC's
members provided for their failure to disclose those social ties in the
report. It gave little weight to the SLC's argument that it was una-
ware of just how substantial ties to Stanford had been.210 The court
observed that the arguments only proved that the SLC had not ex-
amined the trading defendants' ties to Stanford in preparing the Re-
port.211 Also, the absence of live testimony of the SLC's members to
explain its failure to disclose could have influenced the court's deci-
sion. 21 2 Indeed, after the plaintiffs uncovered the ties, the SLC's
members should have presented their live testimony at the hearing to
dispel the court's doubts. Some authorities argue that such a strategy
may be inappropriate in all cases.213 For instance, it can bring a risk of
turning the hearing into a burdensome proceeding as a derivative suit
itself. However, in the cases analogous to Oracle, when an SLC has
nothing to loose, this strategy may be the only way to support an
SLC's motion to terminate.
Thus, it seems that the availability of the information that the SLC
members claimed to not know may have been the key to the court's
holding. The Oracle holding implies a duty upon an SLC to conduct
due diligence into the independence of its members to present an ac-
curate picture to the court. If the SLC has not fulfilled its due dili-
210. Id. at 943.
211. Id. at 943-44.
212. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 665 (quoting Oracle, 824 A.2d at 942):
[I]t is inescapable that a court must often apply to the known facts about a specific
director a consideration of how a reasonable person similarly situated to that director
would behave, given the limited ability of a judge to look into a particular director's
heart and mind.... This is especially so when a special litigation committee chooses, as
was the case here, to eschew any live witness testimony .... [W]ith that.., choice came
an acceptance of the court's need to infer that the special litigation committee members
are persons of typical professional sensibilities.
Oracle, 824 A.2d at 942.
213. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 668.
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gence obligation, it will nevertheless be held accountable for what it
would have learned if it had conducted that inquiry.214
On the other hand, an SLC's duty of full disclosure and due dili-
gence may be the reason for not using an SLC at all. For instance,
during its investigation, an SLC may uncover information that an un-
sophisticated plaintiff would not have assessed. Also, an SLC may
discover corporate wrongdoing in addition to that alleged by a plain-
tiff. It will not cause harm if the court grants the SLC's motion to
terminate the suit. However, it can be really problematic if the court
refuses to follow the SLC's recommendation. In such an event, an
SLC's investigation report will effectively operate to build a plaintiff's
case or to provide a basis for claims by future plaintiffs.215
C. Burden of Proof
In Beam, the court addressed the Oracle court's discussion of direc-
tor's independence in the SLC context. It observed that unlike the
demand-excusal context, where the board was presumed to be inde-
pendent, the SLC had the burden of establishing its own indepen-
dence by a yardstick that must be "'like Caesar's wife'-'above
reproach." 216 By saying this, the Beam court may have made it al-
most impossible for SLCs to establish their independence. As previ-
ously mentioned, the Fuqua court made the same statement regarding
the independence of the SLC consisting of a single member. This ob-
servation established a heightened standard of independence applica-
ble to an SLC comprised of a single member.217 In Beam, the court
ignored the holding of Fuqua and adopted that standard for all SLCs.
While it could appear to be the result of imprecise drafting, the rest of
the Beam holding supports the conclusion that the Delaware Supreme
Court intentionally heightened the standard for all SLCs, not only
those comprising of a single member. For instance, the Beam court
specifically mentioned that the SLC in Oracle consisted of multiple
members. 218 In addition, it is unlikely that the court, directly referring
214. See id. at 665.
[i]t appears that if the SLC has not fulfilled its due diligence into the independence of
its own members, the court may . . . infer that there is a reasonable doubt that the
SLC's investigation was performed in good faith and that its decision to terminate the
litigation is in the corporation's best interests.
Id.
215. See Saparoff, supra note 25, at 733.
216. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. 2004).
217. See Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 666-67.
218. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055. "The Court of Chancery undertook a searching inquiry of the
relationships between the members of the SLC and Stanford University .... Id.
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to this famous phrase, was unaware of the fact that the SLC in Fuqua
consisted of one member.
Also, even before Oracle and Beam, many authorities recognized
that in some instances the use of an SLC might be unwise. 219 They
provided the list of disadvantages associated with the SLC's use. For
instance, the corporation runs some risk that an SLC's investigative
work product will be disclosed to a derivative plaintiff.220 Besides, use
of an SLC gives a plaintiff access to an additional discovery that he or
she otherwise would not have. 221 Furthermore, as previously dis-
cussed, this discovery may operate to build a plaintiff's case. How-
ever, the difficulty or impossibility of proving independence was never
on this list. And the Beam court decided to correct this "omission." It
made a very important suggestion. The court refused to address the
issue of whether the substantive standard of independence in the SLC
context was different from that in the presuit demand context. How-
ever, it noted that availability of discovery in the SLC context,222 cou-
pled with the stringent summary judgment standard, might be
outcome determinative on the issue of independence. 223 Therefore, it
seems that the court suggested that it might be very difficult or even
impossible for the SLC to establish its own independence. Indeed, as
Oracle's experience shows, such a possibility is not without merit.
On the other hand, there can be another explanation for the Beam's
court express refusal to address the issue of substantive standard. The
refusal suggests that the court might want to reserve the right to apply
the new standard established in Oracle in a presuit demand context.
Indeed, it is obvious that, in Beam, the court used the substantive
standard of independence that always existed and that was different
from that applied in Oracle. Unlike in Oracle, the Beam court specifi-
cally stated that allegations of, personal relationships were not enough
to defeat the director's independence. The fact that the court refused
to acknowledge that the substantive standard was different demon-
219. See generally Peter Saparoff et al., Special Litigation Committees: Not Universally Effec-
tive Tools, SE82 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 723 (2000); Patricia R. Hatler et al., Bulletproof Your Special
Litigation Committee in Interested Fiduciary Transactions, 19/4 A.C.C.A. DOCKET 36 (2001),
available at WL 19 No. 4 ACCADKT 36.
220. Saparoff, supra note 25, at 731.
221. Id. at 731. "Use of an SLC, in some jurisdictions, may give a derivative plaintiff access to
additional discovery that he or she would otherwise have been denied. In majority of jurisdic-
tions, discovery is limited to whether the SLC acted independently and in good faith." Id.
222. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055. "[U]nlike the presuit demand context, the SLC analysis contem-
plates not only a shift in the burden of persuasion but also the availability of discovery into
various issues, including independence." Id.
223. See id.
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strates that there is still a possibility that the court will apply the Ora-
cle new stringent standard in the situations not involving SLCs.
D. Legal Advisor's Independence
The court also examined the role that the SLC's legal advisor
played, even though the court ultimately concluded that a reasonable
doubt had not been raised as to the counsel's independence. The
court did not consider material the fact that the law firm the SLC
retained had been engaged to render services for Oracle in the past.224
The SLC also determined that the work the advisor had done previ-
ously was not material, and the plaintiffs had not challenged its deter-
mination.225 Such a detailed examination of the SLC advisor's role
should serve as a practical warning: a counsel must be prepared to
establish his independence as well, in order to place the counsel's ad-
vice and impartiality beyond doubt. Although courts have been criti-
cal of legal advisors chosen or recommended by interested managers
or by a controlling shareholder before Oracle,226 it is quite possible
that now legal advisors will be subject to even more increased scru-
tiny. For instance, courts may start evaluating the SLC legal advisor's
independence according to the requirements set forth for the SLC's
members themselves, taking into account personal and social
connections.
IV. IMPACT
Oracle is important in several aspects. First, the court in Oracle im-
posed a stringent test for independence in the context of an SLC. Pre-
viously, a director was not considered independent if he or she had
direct business dealings with any of the people being investigated.
The new ruling includes those who might just indirectly benefit from
their relationship with the defendants through charitable or nonprofit
organizations. The Oracle court stated that it applied the standard for
independence that always existed. However, previous case law sug-
gests the opposite. Although the court recognized this inconsistency,
it failed to explain it.
Second, although the Beam court limited Oracle's holding to an
SLC context, it is very suspicious that it refused to hold that the sub-
224. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 925 (Del. Ch. 2003).
225. Id.
226. Hatler, supra note 34, at 45. "Although an interested fiduciary can recommend advisors,
this practice is generally not advisable. In the event that an interested party makes a recommen-
dation to the special committee, the committee should carefully evaluate it before making a
selection." Id.
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stantive standard of independence was different in a presuit demand
context. Such a refusal might suggest that the court reserved the right
to apply this new standard in the situations not involving SLCs. This
is especially true when the whole Beam holding demonstrates that the
court did, in fact, use the substantive standard of independence differ-
ent from the one used in Oracle. The fact that the court refused to
acknowledge it shows that the court left the door open for reconsider-
ation of its position regarding the substantive standard of indepen-
dence in a presuit demand context.
Third, the Oracle case made it clear that directors must make a
careful evaluation of the individuals they chose to form an SLC, in-
cluding new board members recruited to the board for purposes of
forming an SLC.227 . Even when the board recruits the SLC's members
after the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred, this may not be suffi-
cient. Thus, in selecting an SLC, the board should choose directors
without any connections to the corporation or management, even re-
mote ones. However, this may be an impossible task. As Oracle dem-
onstrates, there are no connections so tenuous that the court could not
construe as giving rise to a reasonable doubt of an SLC member's
independence.
Fourth, anything less than the full disclosure of an SLC's ties to the
company or board of directors will raise doubts about the SLC's inde-
pendence.228 The emphasis the court placed on the fact that the direc-
tor's various ties to Stanford only emerged after the plaintiffs had
completed limited discovery illustrates that the outcome of the case
could have been different, had the SLC fully disclosed those ties itself.
Thus, even if the new standard for independence was fatal in Oracle,
it is possible that this standard will not play such a role in future cases'
outcomes if members of SLCs themselves advise the court of the exis-
tence of the social ties.
Finally, as the Beam decision indicated, the procedural distinction
relating to the diametrically-opposed burdens and the availability of
discovery into independence may make an SLC an ineffective tool for
a corporate defendant. The use of an SLC was always time consuming
and expensive. 229 Besides, there was always a possibility of the court's
refusal to grant an SLC's motion to dismiss. Now such a possibility is
much more substantial. Under these circumstances, an SLC may stop
its existence as a tool for terminating a derivative suit. This is espe-
227. See Louis M. BROWN ET AL., THE LEGAL AUDIT: CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGA-
TION § 3:11 (2004), available at WL LACII S 3:11.
228. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 668.
229. See Saparoff, supra note 25, at 726.
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cially true since the Oracle and Beam decisions left some important
questions open. As previously discussed, the court did not answer the
question of whether the substantive standard of independence in the
SLC context differs from that in a demand-excusal context. Also, it
did not answer the question of whether the standard of independence
is the same for a single-member SLC and a multi-member one. The
court should respond to these questions to clarify the future of an
SLC.
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V. CONCLUSION
Oracle established a new more stringent standard for independence
in the context of SLCs. This standard makes it very difficult, perhaps
impossible, for an SLC to establish its independence. It appears that
the only chance for an SLC to survive judicial scrutiny is to be com-
posed of the members that are total strangers to a corporate defen-
dant. If that is not the case, then it is clear that even the most
insubstantial, ties that an SLC's members have with a corporate de-
fendant should be fully disclosed to the court. Further, a corporate
defendant should be careful when selecting an SLC's legal advisor.
As Oracle indicates, Delaware courts may start evaluating the legal
advisor's independence according to the standard they apply to an
SLC's members. Therefore, all these restrictions suggest that an SLC
may stop being used as a universal tool for termination of derivative
actions.
230. Kistenbroker, supra note 42, at 669.
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